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The Turkish economy and its growth:
anoverview
I. Introduction
The Turkish economy underwent profound changes from the end of World
War II to 1971. Real national income more than tripled, while the Turkish
population increased from 20 to 36 million. The resultant increase in real per
capita income and government efforts to accelerate development led to an
increase in the share of GNP allocated to capital formation: from 9.7 per cent
in 1948 to 21 per cent in 1970.1 The share of agriculture in GNP fell from
51.3 per cent in 1948 to 29.1 per cent in 1970, while that of industry rose
from 10.1 per cent to 17.5 per cent.
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship of the Turkish
foreigntrade and balance-of-payments experience to Turkish economic
growth. Obviously a country's growth is the outcome of a host of interacting
factors, both positive and negative. No analysis of the role of any one factor
can be undertaken without reference to these others. This chapter is there-
fore intended to provide an overview of the Turkish economy and its growth
and to place the foreign trade sector in perspective. In the next four sections
of the chapter the structure and growth of the Turkish economy and the
major government policies influencing growth are discussed. A fifth section
provides a summary of the chronological development of the Turkish foreign
trade regime, which will be the subject of more intensive investigation in later
chapters, and a final section of Chapter I indicates the plan of the work as a
whole.
II. Turkish economic growth prior to 1950
The year 1950 will be used as a starting point in studying the relationship
of the foreign trade sector and economic growth. Several reasons led to the
1. Throughout this book 1971 will be taken as the terminal year of the study, apart from
a few references to developments in the early part of 1972 (see Appendix C). Use of
an earlier final year will signify that laterdata are not available as of the summer of
1972.4 The Turkish economyandits growth
choice of that year: by 1950, Turkey had recovered to a large extent from
the extreme abnormalities of the early post World War II years; the availabili-
ty and reliability of data decreases sharply as one goes further back in time; a
new government was elected in 1950, one whose economic policies were
important in shaping Turkey's economic growth throughout the subsequent
decade; and since 1950 preceded the balance-of-payments difficulties which
later emerged, use of 1950 as a starting point permits the analysis of factors
which led to those difficulties.
Although the decade of the 1950's contrasts sharply with the earlier de-
cades of the Turkish Republic, the earlier period was formative. The Turkish
Independence movement started in 1919 as the Ottoman Empire dissolved,
and led to the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the dominant
figure in this evolution, from 1919 until his death in 1938, being Kemal
Atatürk.
The 1920's constituted a period when Atatürk and his associates were
concentrating primarily on forming the political and social structure of the
new Turkish nation and on setting the outlines of the republic's foreign
policy. With occasional exceptions, there was little conscious economic policy
relating to development goals, although the transport system was nationalized
and a State Monopolies Agency (alcohol and cigarettes) was established. The
latter was intended primarily as a means of raising revenue. Insofar as there
was conscious economic policy aimed at economic growth, it consisted pri-
marily of relying upon private enterprise to provide it.2
The decade of the 1920's saw numerous reforms: Turkey switched from
the Arabic to a modified Latin alphabet, purdah and the fez were abolished,
and the state was declared secular rather than religious.3 Partly because of the
disruptions, especially the cross-migration of Greeks and Turks associated
with the end of the war with Greece, partly because of debt-servicing obliga-
tions, and partly for other reasons, it appears that per capita disposable
income in Turkey hardly changed during the 1920's.4
The new Turkish Republic had little control over the foreign trade regime
before 1929. The Sultans under the Ottoman Empire had sold to foreign
powers the rights to impose taxes and tariffs (the Capitulations) in exchange
for various considerations. The Sultans had simultaneously accumulated huge
debts, settlement of which was not made until 1923 with the Treaty of
2. For a fuller account of government economic policy during the period, see James W.
Land, "The Role of Government in the Economic Development of Turkey, 1923 to
1963," Rice University Program of Development Studies, Paper No. 8, Fall 1970.
3. See Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics —theTransition to a Multi-Party System,
Princeton University Press (Princeton) 1959, Chapters 2 and 3.
4. Z.Y. Hershiag, Turkey: The Challenge of Economic Growth, E.J. Brill (Leiden), 1968,
p. 58.
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Lausanne.Under this treaty, Turkey was obliged to permit the Capitulations
to continue until 1929 and to repay a fraction of the Ottoman debt amount-
ing to TL 129 million —whichcan be compared with total export earnings in
1923 of TL 85million.Throughout the 1920's the new government found
itself saddled with massive debt-servicing obligations but with little control
over its ability to service them. The Ottoman debt was renegotiated sporadi-
cally throughout the 1920's and early 1930's, but not without embarrassment
for the government on each round. As will be seen below, foreign indebted-
ness has continued to be a problem for the government of Turkey throughout
its existence. Memories of the Capitulations and of the Ottoman debt settle-
ment are undoubtedly an important influence on Turkish foreign trade
policy.
The free enterprise orientation of the Turkish government ended with the
Great Depression. The very slow rate of increasein per capita income
throughout the 1920's contributed to general skepticism about free enter-
prise. The end of the Capitulations increased the government's range of policy
alternatives, while the decline in export earnings attendant upon the Great
Depression virtually forced a shift in economic policy.
The government shiftedtothe economic philosophy usually called
"Etatism", a concept never clearly articulated.5 The main thrust of this move-
ment was that government-owned enterprises should be started in an effort to
raise living standards, and that these enterprises should be the major stimuli
to economic growth. It was during the 1930's that State Economic Enter-
prises (SEEs) were started in the industrial field. Two Five Year Plans were
formulated.6 These plans endorsed infant industry protection and placed
emphasis on the development of domestic textile, chemical, sugar, building
materials, coal, iron and steel, paper and cellulose, and other industries,pri-
manly through government enterprises. SEEs have played an important part
in Turkey's economic growth since the 1930's. The First Five Year Plan was
implemented, but the Second was not implemented owing to the outbreak of
World War II.
Hershlag estimates that Turkey's income per capita increased by 19 per
cent in constant prices during the decade from 1929 to 1939, about 1.7 per
5. For a discussion of Etatism and its origins, see Osman Okyar, "The Concept of
Etatism," economic Journal, March 1965.
6. These five year plans generally focused upon industrial development, and were not
comprehensive of all sectors of economic activity. They should not be confused with
the Five Year Plans of 1963—1967 and 1968—1972, which are called the First Five
Year Plan (FFYP) and Second Five Year Plan (SFYP), respectively. The first five year
plan of the 1930's started in 1934. The second started in 1939, but was not really
implemented, as World War H broke out. See Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of
Modern Turkey, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press (London), 1961, pp. 268— 70,
and p. 296.
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cent annually.7 Some progress had thus been made toward the goal of eco-
nomic growth and higher living standards on the eve of World War II. How-
ever, growth had been slow and per capita income, by European standards,
was very low. Contrasted with nations which achieved independence after
World War II, Turkey's head start consisted primarily of the political and
social changes which had been accomplished rather than of solid progress on
the economic front.
The already high level of government intervention was increased with
World War II. And despite substantial tax increases, the disappearance of
foreign sources of supply and increased government expenditures simulta-
neously led to rapid inflation. Although some industries' output increased
markedly, supply bottlenecks prevented rapid expansion in most. James W.
Land estimates that the entire period of 1933—1948 saw an average annual
growth of income of three per cent annually, but only of two per cent per
annum from 1938 to 1948. This slower rate of growth during the latter
period is generally attributed to stagnation during the War years.8
There was some relaxation in controls over international trade after the
War, and to adjust for the rapid wartime inflation, the Turkish lira was
devalued in August 1946, from TL 1.28 per U.S. dollar to IL 2.80 per dollar.9
Work was begun on a five year plan in the summer of 1946. However, in the
rapidly changing economic environment of the late 1940's the plan was not
implemented. Simultaneously, political changes were occurring in Turkey.
Etatism, which implied widespread government intervention in economic ac-
tivity, continued to be the underlying economic ideology. In 1950, the Re-
publican Party —historicallyAtaturk's —wasdefeated, and the Democratic
Party under Menderes, elected.1 0
III.Development planning and economic policy, 1950 to 1970
Economic policy during the 1950's
Most writers have cited economic factors, and in particular the rejection of
detailed controls and/or Etatism, as a major factor in the Democratic Party's
victory.'However, all major political parties during the 1950 campaign
7. Hershiag, op. cit. (Note 4), p. 121.
8. See Land, op. cit. (Note 2), pp. 8 ff.
9. The cost of living index in Istanbul stood at 101.4 in 1939 (1938 =100)and rose to
354.4 by 1945. OverseasEconomicSurveys —Turkey,His Majesty's Stationery
Office (London), 1948.
10. See Karpat, op. cit. (Note 3), Chap. 8 for a fuller discussion.
11. See, for example, ibid., and Lewis, op. cit. (Note 6), pp. 312 ff.
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attacked the network of detailed controls and high taxes that had arisen
under the banner of Etatism and campaigned for a greater scope for private
enterprise. Menderes had campaigned on a platform that actually included
selling many of the SEEs to private firms.
But such a sale did not transpire: there was political protest against selling
the profitable ones, and no willing buyer for the unprofitable SEEs. Indeed,
the SEEs expanded their share of industrial activity during the 1950's. In
1950 when Menderes gained power and hence Etatism theoretically ended, 63
per cent of value-added in Turkish industry originated from private firms and
37 per cent from SEEs. By 1960 when Menderes' government fell, 52 per
cent of industrial value-added originated in the private sector and 48 per cent
in the public.1 2
Themain reason for this outcome appears to have had little or nothing to
do with economic philosophy. Rather, initial attempts to sell the SEEs met
with strong political objections. After the crop failure of 1954 the SEEs
became a useful instrument for attaining government objectives when the
approach of 1950—1953 appeared to have failed. The SEE investments in-
creased rapidly, financed by Central Bank credits; the SEEs thus grew rela-
tively faster than the private sector during the 1950's.
Economic policy during the years of the Menderes government can be
divided into three periods. The first, from the election until 1954, was a
period during which emphasis was placed upon increasing agricultural produc-
tion. The second, from the massive crop failure of 1954 until August 1958,
was characterizçd by domestic and foreign economic difficulties and eco-
nomic policy consisted largely of ad hoc measures to counter them. The third
period, starting with stabilization program and de facto devaluation in August
1958, came to an end with the Revolution of May 1960.
It should be pointed out before examining each of these periods that the
common denominator of economic policy during the 1950's was lack of
coordination. Prime Minister Menderes had a "seeming phobia about any
aspect of economic planning"which led to a lack of any clearly formulated
overall economic policy, even for government expenditures.Thusthe pe-
12. See Land, op. cit. (Note 2), p. 29, Table 6 for the underlying data.
13. Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960—1961, Brookings Institution (Wash.
ington) 1963, P. 12.
14. In 1953, a report by Hollis B. Chenery, George E. Brandow and Edwin J. Cohn,
Turkish Investment and Economic Development, Foreign Operations Administration
Special Mission to Turkey (Ankara), December 1953, was prepared under American
auspices, calling attention to the inflationary danger and to the need for better
coordination in virtually all aspects of government expenditure policy. "...The fact
that it discussed at all the inflationary situation prevailing in Turkey was said to be
representative of its negative approach. All Turks who had in any way helped in the
preparation of the report were frowned upon the few copies which had been
made toward the goal of eco-
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nods are characterized more by changes in economic conditions to which the
government responded on a case-by-case basis rather than by consciously
formulated and enunciated policy shifts.
1950 to1954.The first three years of the Menderes regime were marked
by a rapid expansion of agricultural output and a substantial increase in
governmental infrastructure investments. The resulting boom also led to a
buoyant economy generally, as demand grew rapidly in response to increases
in agricultural income. Increases in agricultural production, especially of
wheat and other grains, resulted primarily from extending the area under
cultivation. Rapid output increases were accompanied by a decline in wheat
yields, since much of the additional land was submarginal.
The government seems to have adopted the view that emphasis upon agri-
cultural expansion was the best policy for economic growth. Several factors
evidently contributed to this emphasis. (1) The political support for the
Menderes regime originated largely from the peasantry; thus Menderes and his
government gave priority to road-building and other investment projects with-
in the rural sector. (2) Menderes' commitments to free enterprise and the
pricing system were more consistent with agricultural price supports and
other pricing incentives (liberal credit policies, etc.) than with direct interven-
tion. 1(3) In post-war Europe, where food shortage was perceived to be a
major problem, Turkey was urged during Marshall Plan consultations to focus
upon expansion of food output.16
Theforeign exchange regime was very liberal during the years 1950 to
1953. With rapid increases inagricultural production, exports expanded
sharply —asdid also imports (see Table 1-6 below) —sincedemand for both
investment and consumption goods imports increased. By the end of 1953
the government was forced to impose controls over imports and exchange
control was introduced in response to mounting short-term indebtedness and
a large current account deficit. Domestic economic policy, however, did not
basically shift until 1954, when a massive crop failure occurred.
1954 to1958.Agricultural production dropped 20 per cent between 1953
and 1954, largely as a result of bad weather. By that time opportunities for
rapid increases in agricultural output through extensive investment had large-
ly ceased; but the massive crop failure sharply focused attention on the
circulated were confiscated by the Government...": Public International Develop-
ment FinancingResearch Project of the Columbia School of Law. Report No. 3 (New
York), 1962. p. 18.
15. Columbia School of Law, op. cit. (Note 14), p. 11.
16. Relat Aktan, Analysis and Assessment of the Economic Effects Public Law480Title
1 ProgramTurkey,no publisher indicated (Ankara), 1964, p. 36.
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inherent difficulties of reliance upon agriculture. Meanwhile, the inflationary
pressures resulting from financing agricultural price-support operations were
intensified with the decline in agricultural output.
Government policy became increasingly interventionist, with continued
resort to additional direct controls. Emphasis upon agricultural development
was reduced. The balance-of-payments pressures which had emerged in 1952
and 1953 intensified. Thus on both the domestic and foreign fronts detailed
government regulation and intervention in economic activity replaced the
rather more liberal economic policies of earlier years. The years 1954 to 1958
were ones of increasing inflation, continued balance-of-payments difficulties
and other economic problems.'
1958 to 1960. In August 1958 the government embarked upon a Stabiliza-
tion Program with a de facto devaluation of the Turkish lira and an at-
tempted halt to inflation. Tight credit ceilings and other measures taken in
consultation with creditor countries resulted in a sharp drop in the rate of
inflation, but by late 1959 the government began relaxing its credit and
expenditure policies. In May 1960 the Menderes government was overthrown
by a group of military leaders. 1
8
Economicpolicy during the 1960's
A major motive for the takeover that ended the Menderes era appears to
have been the fear that the government was reverting to the inflationary
policies that dominated the pre.1958 period. The military intervened and
appointed a civilian government which ruled for eighteen months, until elec-
tions were again held under a new Constitution.
The Republican Peoples' Party gained power in a coalition government
after the elections of 1961. The Justice Party won the election in 1965 and
was in power until April 1971. The Republican Party has advocated economic
planning, a large role for government economic activity, and has been some-
what more suspicious of private enterprise, whereas the Justice Party assigned
a greater role to the private sector. Nonetheless, economic policy had a con-
siderable continuity throughout the 1960's that was in maiked contrast to
the 1950's. One of the major commitments of the revolutionary government
was to greater coordination of economic policy. A State Planning Organiza-
tion (SPO) was established, and its role was defined in the new Turkish
Constitution. 19 Workbegan almost immediately on a comprehensive Five
17. The characteristics of this period are discussed more fully in Chapter II, below.
18. See Chapter IV, below, for a fuller discussion of the period.
19. See Chapter V, below, for a fuller discussion of the State Planning Organization and
the role of planning in the 1960's.
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Fig. 1. Growth of real GNP, co
1971.
Table I-i provides basic data on the gross national product and its compo-
sition over the 1950 to 1970 period, and the behavior of real GNP, invest-
ment, and consumption is plotted in Fig. 1. Real GNP tripled between 1950
and 1970, for an average annual rate of growth of 5.7 per cent and an annual
growth in per capita income of 3.0 per cent. Per capita income in 1970 was
20. First Five Year Development Plan 1963—1 967, Government of Turkey, Prime Minis-
try, State Planning Organization (Ankara), 1963.
21. Second Five Year Development Plan 1968—1972, Government of Turkey, Prime
Ministry, State Planning Organization (Ankara), 1968. At the time of writing, the
Third Five Year Plan 1973—1977 is in the final stage of formulation.
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10 The Turkish economy and its growth
Year Plan which officially began in 1963.20 The Plan was implemented and
its successor, the Second Five Year Plan of 1968 to 1972, marked a continua-
tion of planning although with greater emphasis upon incentives to the pri-
vate sector.2
Both Plans have adopted a target growth rate of 7 per cent annually. Each
laid down sectoral targets which assumed importance in government invest-
ment policies and in setting incentives for the private sector. The develop-
ment of Turkish industry has been stressed in each Plan, with particular
emphasis upon the development of new industries. As such, import-substitu-
tion goals became a conscious element of development policy.
The important point for present purposes is that during the 1960's the
foreign trade regime was viewed as one of the instruments to be used to attain
development goals. Although balance-of-payments difficulties often forced
adjustments in the payments regime, those difficulties themselves were largely
the result of the development effort and its implied import demands. "For-
eign exchange shortage" was perceived as a bottleneck to growth, and the
SPO has encouraged export promotion and emphasized import-substitution in
response to that perception. Of course had foreign exchange earnings been
greater it is likely that import-substitution would have been encouraged at a
slower rate. Many of the side effects of the payments regime were undoubted-
ly the unintended result of greater-than-anticipated foreign exchange stringen-
cy, and detailed administration of the payments regime on occasion departed
from the intent of the plans. Nonetheless, the Turkish foreign trade and
payments policy of the 1960's can generally be regarded as consciously coor-
dinated with development goals, in sharp contrast to the 1950's when policy
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TL 3,764 or at the official exchange rate, $251. The Turkish population was
estimated to be 35.7 million in 1970, having grown at an average annual rate
of 2.7 per cent over the 1950—1970 period.
As can be seen, the growth of the Turkish economy has not been unifonn-
ly sustained over the entire period. Growth was extremely rapid from 1950 to
1953. Fluctuations in the growth rate have been associated with bad crop
years (especially 1954) and growth was slowed down by the balance-of-
payments crisis and readjustment that followed in the years 1958 to 1961.
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Notes:a) SPO and SIS each have published GNP estimates since 1959. SIS's estimates
are based on 1948 prices until 1961 and on 1961 prices thereafter. SPO esti-
mates were used to provide opportunity for making comparisons with the real
GNP series. The SPO estimates are based on SIS data, the difference being the
estimate of agricultural production in 1958, and hence the weights used for
estimating the growth rate in later years.
b) No estimate was made of inventory investment until the late 1960's. Con-
sumption was estimated as a residual, and hence inventory accumulation was
implicitly included in it. To maintain comparability, investment in stock,
amounting to about one per cent of GNP, was included in the consumption
data for later years.
c) 1971 data are provisional estimates.
Sources: Columns (1) and (2): SPO data, as given in Economic and Social Indicators —
Turkey,US. Agency for International Development (Ankara), 1971.
Column (3): derived from column (2).
Columns (4) to (7): 1950 to 1968 from Yearbook of NationalAccounts Sta-
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between 1948 and 1953 and only 2.7 per cent per annum between 1953 and
1961. Growth since 1961 has averaged 6.5 per cent.
Gross capital formation over the entire period has risen from 10 per cent
of GNP to 20—21 per cent, while private consumption has fallen, in percent-
age terms, from an average of 75 per cent in the period 1950 to 1954 to
69—72 per cent in the last half of the Government consumption, of
which a sizeable fraction is defense expenditures,23 has also declined relative-
ly over the period. As indicated in Table 1-1, there has been an import surplus
over virtually the entire period, reaching its peak in the first half of the
1960's. Itis evident that part of the increase in the rate of gross capital
formation originated from an inflow of foreign credits, especially in the years
from 1959 to 1965. The bulk of these credits came from foreign aid, as will
be seen below.
Gross capital formation
Table 1-2 indicates the composition of gross capital formation, the most
rapidly growing component of GNP. Several notable features of the Turkish
Table 1-2
Composition of gross domestic capital formation (percentage distribution)
1951 1955 1960 1965 1969
A. Private sector
1) Dwellings 22.8 30.1 206 21.9 22.6
2)Otherbuildings 9.1 9.2 6.5 6.4 6.6
3) Other construction 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.5
4) Machinery and equipment 28.9 17.6 22.3 15.2 14.5
Total Private 61.9 57.6 50.0 44.3 44.2
B. Public sector
1) Dwellings 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.7
2) Other buildings . 10.4 10.7 11.4 13.7 14.0
3) Other construction 19.1 22.1 24.8 28.1 26.8
4) Machinery and equipment 7.3 9.1 13.6 12.9 14.3
Total Public 38.1 42.4 50.0 55.7 55.8
Note:Due to rounding-off of uneven fractions, totals may not add up exactly to
those given in the table.
Source:National Income, 1938, 1948—1970. Pub. No. 625, State Institute of Statis-
tics (Ankara), 1972.
22. But see Note b to Table I-i.
23. According to Frederick Shorter, military expenditures averaged 7.3 per cent of GNP
over the fifteen-year period 1948—196 2. See Frederick C. Shorter, "Military Expendi-
tures and the Allocation of Resources," in Frederick C. Shorter (ed), Four Studies
on the Economic Development of Turkey, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. (London), 1967,
p.43.
reconomy are evident from the data. First, the government's share of total
investment is high, and has increased throughout the period, rising from 38
per cent in 1951 (1950 data are not available) to about 56 per cent in the
late 1960's. Government investment has taken place not only in infrastruc-
ture but also through the SEEs in manufacturing, mining, and so on. A
second notable feature of the Turkish economy is the very high fraction of
total capital formation which originates in construction activities.24 Only
28.8 per cent of gross capital formation, both public and private, was allo-
cated to machinery and equipment in 1969. This figure contrasts sharply with
percentages in other countries in 1968: Argentina, 45;Chile, 45;Greece,40;
Israel, 41; Italy, 36; Spain, 49; and Taiwan, 53.2.2 5
Composition of output by sectors
Table 1-3 presents estimates of the sectoral origin of national income. The
estimates are in 1948 prices for the years 1951 to 1961 and in 1961 prices for
later years. Because of data unavailability, no attempt was made to convert to
a comparable price basis for the two decades. The trends nevertheless stand
out clearly. Agriculture's share in national income has gradually declined
from 51 to 30 per cent over the two decades. Manufacturing has meanwhile
grown more rapidly than GNP, rising from 9 per cent of national income in
the early 1950's to 17 per cent in 1967. The share of other non-agricultural
sectors has risen somewhat over the period.
Hence Turkey's comparatively rapid growth has been accompanied by a
structural change as the relative importance of agricultural production has
declined, although this factor still remains large.26 The growth of manufac-
turing production has been relatively rapid, stimulated primarily
substitution.
24. It is generally believed that the unusually large fraction of investment in construction
is attributable to Turkish tax law, which encourages new building. New residential
buildings are exempted from tax for five to ten years, and even commercial buildings
are exempt for three years. The tax rate for buildings thereafter is 0.3 per cent of
assessed value, with rental income above TL 5,000 not subject to tax. Capital gains
on buildings sold four or more years after construction, moreover, are tax-exempt.
See R.A. Newberry, Taxation in Turkey (Istanbul), September 1964, and HUsnU
Kiziyalli, Turk Vergi Sisteminin Ekonomik Etkileri, State Planning Office (Ankara),
1965.
25. Data from Yearbook of National Income Accounts, United Nations, 1969, country-
pages.
26. Turkey appears to have a strong comparative advantage in a number of agricultural
commodities, including fresh fruits and vegetables and livestock, for which Western
Europe is a natural market and the income elasticity of demand is high. Thus one
would not expect the share of agriculture to decline with GNP growth as much as in
some other countries.
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Table 1-3
Industrial origin of national income, 1951 to 1970 (billions of IL)
government's share of total
the period, rising from 38
about 56 per cent in the
lace not only in infrastruc-
ing, mining, and so on. A
is the very high fraction of
activities.24 Only
ubiic and private, wasailo-
igure contrasts sharply with
1, 45; Chile, 45; Greece, 40;
$
national income. The
961 and in 1961 prices for
ript was made to convert to
e trends nevertheless stand
me has gradually declined
nufacturing has meanwhile
:ent of national income in
e of other non-agricultural
A. 1948 Factor Prices
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5.55.86.45.15.66.16.27.37.37.47.2
0.10.10.20.10.10.20.20.20.20.20.2
1.01.0 1.1 1.21.21.3 1.4 1.4 1.51.51.5
0.00.00.00.00.10.10.10.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
0.50.60.80.70.70.70.90.9 1.01.00.9





0.91.01.2 1.21.21.2 1.4 1.51.6 1.6 1.8
—0.0—0.0—0.0 —0.0—0.0—0.0—0.0—0.0—0.0 —0.0—0.0
l0.511.412.711.512.313.214.015.716.316.716.7
B. 1961 Factor Prices
19611962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
19.020.221.721.721.023.423.624.024.024.3












a) Provisional estimates for 1967 and 1968.
b) Preliminary estimates for 1969 and 1970.
iource:National Income, 1938, 1948—1970, Pub. No. 625, State Institute of Statistics(Ankara), 1971.16 The Turkish economy and its growth Introduction
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Sources: GNP from Table 1-1. Exports and imports from Statistical Yearbook of Turkey
1968, Pub. No. 580, State Institute of Statistics (Ankara), 1969; and Ayl:k
Bülten, Central Bank, October—December 1971.
The importance of exports and imports in GNP is indicated in Table 1-4.
Imports have averaged about 8 per cent of GNP, while exports have declined
somewhat in relative importance. The constancy of the import share reflects
the fact that capital formation has a much higher import content than con-
sumption and has grown much more rapidly than GNP. Thus despite the
stability of the overall share there has been considerable import-substitution.
The relatively low share of foreign trade in Turkish GNP understates the
importance of the trade sector in the Turkish economy. Because of the im-
port-substitution which has taken place, Turkish industry is dependent upon
intermediate goods imports, while there is a wide range of capital goods
which are not produced in Turkey.
Moreover, Turkey is committed to joining the Common Market. Under a
1963 Protocol, the 1960's were a preliminary period during which Turkey
received tariff-quota preferences on some of her major exports, but had no
reciprocal obligations.27 In July 1970 Turkey and the European Economic
Community (EEC) formally concluded the preliminary period, and the first
twelve-year stage of a twenty-two year transition period was embarked upon.
After the completion of the two stages, Turkey will become a full member of
the EEC under the terms of the agreement.28 Thus Turkey will eventually
harmonize her trade policies with those of other EEC countries. She is com-
mitted as such to a pattern of open economic development, at least in the
27. Vural "Foreign Trade of Turkey and the European Common Market," in
Foreign Trade and Economic Development, Economic and Social Studies Conference
Board (Istanbul), 1968.
28. Turkish Economic Review, August 1970, p. 14.
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over the past two decades.
Fiscal andmoneta?ydevelopments
As was seen in Table 1-2, the government has been extremely important in
Turkey's growth, not only in setting the environment for the private sector,
but in its own investment activities. Moreover, there are key government
enterprises affecting virtually every phase of economic activity: TMO (Toprak
Mahsulleri Ofisi: Soil Products Office, a SEE) is a major purchaser of agricul-
tural commodities and has established minimum prices for most major agri-
cultural commodities throughout the period under review. Etibank, one of
the first SEEs, controls and operates all mining output of copper, chrome,
mercury, lead and sulphur.
Government policy therefore affects economic growth in all the usual
ways and in addition contributes directly to it through the SEEs. It will be
seen below, in analyzing various aspects of the Turkish experience, that the
role of the SEEs has been important, not only in their own performance and
growth but also in their financing. Because their operations are integrally
intertwined with the government accounts and cannot readily be disentan-
gled, meaningful data on government accounts are difficult to obtain, and
such data as are available are difficult to interpret. At this stage, therefore,
aggregate data which may be of some use in providing an overview of the
Turkish economy are presented, although the reader is warned to interpret
them with extreme care.
Table 1-5 presents the basic data. The first column gives the money supply
as of the end of each year. The money supply more than doubled during the
period 1954 to 1958, reflecting primarily the Central Bank financing of SEE
deficits.29 The rate of increase in the money supply fell off markedly in the
l960-to-l965 period and rose again thereafter.
Central government expenditures over the 1950-to-1968 period rose from
13 per cent of GNP to about 20 per cent of GNP. Tax revenues have risen
with expenditures, although a portion of government expenditures has been
financed by aid flows, the sale of savings bonds and deficit financing. The
increase in government expenditures has been partly responsible for the rise
in the rate of capital formation, while the increase in tax revenues has been a
significant factor in raising the savings rate.
The last columns of Table I-S give the price indices for home goods and
wholesale prices on a 1958 base. These indices are subject to several down-
29. This phenomenon will be explored more fully in Chapter II. Suffice it to say here
that SEE accounts are separate from those of the central government budget.
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Table 1-5
Money supply, government accounts, and price level, 1950 to 1970
Money
Supply
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FromButçe Kanunlar:, Ministry of Finance.
c)Not published after 1968.
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Table I-S (continued)
Sources: Money Supply: Aylzk Buiten, Central Bank, October—December 1971. End-of-
year figures.
Government Accounts: 1950 and 1953 to 1962, James W. Land, Economic
Accounts of Government in Turkey, Pub. No. 566-17, SIS (Ankara), 1969.
1963 to 1968: data kindly provided to the author by SIS.
Price Indices: Home goods index —IstanbulChamber of Commerce index as
reported in International Financial Statistics.
Wholesale price index: Ministry of Commerce index reported in International
Financial Statistics.
ward biases: (1) the weights are those of 1938, and thus the rise in the price
of manufactured commodities relative to agricultural commodities is under-
weighted,3° and (2) prices used in compiling the indexare official prices in
the many instances —especiallyin the 1955-to-1958 period —whencom-
modities were subject to price controls. Hence there is everyreason to believe
that the index understates the actual degree of inflation, especially in the
mid-1950's. But even by these figures the rapid inflation Turkey experienced
in the mid-1950's is evident. The price level doubled between 1955 and 1959,
according to the official index. The rate of inflation since 1960 has been
considerably more moderate, averaging less than 3 per cent annually between
1960 and 1965 and about 6 per cent annually since 1965.
It is the purpose of the remainder of this study to focus upon Turkey's
trade and payments regime and its effects upon and interaction with resource
allocation and economic growth in the 1950-to-1971 period. Various aspects
of the Turkish experience will be separately analyzed in later chapters.
To place each of these aspects in perspective it will be useful to start with
an overview of the evolution of the payments regime in accordance with the
phases outlined in the Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development
research project. Although any demarcation contains some arbitrary ele-
ments, the best delineation appears to be:3 1
1950to September 1953 Phase V
September 1953 to December 1954 Phase I
January 1955 to August 1958 Phase II
30. Sevil Korum, Tiirkiyede Toptan E1ya Fiyar(ari Endeksi, Sevinç Matbaasi (Ankara)
1968.
31. See Appendix D-2 for definitions of "Phases" as used in the project.
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August 1958 to August 1960
August 1960 to December 1963
January 1964 to August 1970
August 1970 to December 1970
January 1971 to Summer 1972
1950 to September 1953: Phase V
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A payments deficit was emerging during this period, but the conjunction
of massive aid inflows (which covered 80 per cent of the net current account
deficit between 1950 and 195532), favorable world prices for Turkey's ex-
ports and the emergence of wheat exports obscured the underlying situation.
Moreover a massive increase in imports, permitted under a fairly liberal trade
regime, offset inflationary pressure that would otherwise have resulted in
price increases. Table 1-6 gives summary balance-of-payments data. As can be
seen, imports virtually doubled between 1950 and 1952; the current account
deficit in 1952 amounted to 3 per cent of GNP despite the fact that export
earnings had risen by $ 100 million, or 40 per cent in the two-year interval.
The payments regime remained fairly liberal until September 1953. Ex-
ports were generally free from licensing requirements, although exporters
were supposed to surrender all proceeds to the Central Bank within three
months of the date of export, with the exception of proceeds from a few
designated "minor exports" (about 3 per cent of exports by value) which
could be retained for purposes of importing a specified list of goods not other-
wise legally importable. Imports were all subject to license. Most goods, how-
ever, were on a "liberalized"listfor which licenses were automatically
granted. Some commodities were subject to global quotas, but these were the
exception rather than the rule. Guarantee deposits were required against
import license applications, but only in an amount equal to 4 per cent of the
value of the license, and were subject to refund if the license was not granted
within a month.33 Foreign investment was encouraged, required little paper-
work, and guarantees were given for repatriation of profits and capital.34
September 1953 to August 1958: Phases land II
September 1953 saw the first moves toward restricting international trans-
actions. It was decreed that all imports would be subject to "strict licensing."
32. Economic Situation in Turkey, 1959, OEEC (Paris), 1960, p. 30. Henceforth, this
will be cited as OEEC, Turkey, 1959.
33. Imports on government account were excluded from these regulations.
34. For a summary of the regime during 1952 see Fourth Annual Report, Exchange
Restrictions, International Monetary Fund (Washington), 1953, pp. 278—81.
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Also, the provision that exporters could use their foreign exchange under
certain conditions was abolished and in its place a defacro multiple exchange
rate system was introduced. Subsidies of 25, 40, and 50 per cent were pay.
able on certain exports, while taxes of 25, 50, and 75 per cent were levied on
"nonessential" imports. This decree was quickly followed with another on
November 1, which removed all items from the Liberalized List (for which
licenses were then fairly automatically granted) except machinery, industrial
raw materials and spare parts. Other commodities could be imported only if
they were "needed for economic development" and import surcharges of 25
to 75 per cent were imposed upon them.
Thereafter the control system was subject to frequent modification. Both
quantitative controls and multiple rates were generally used and subject to
rapid changes. Buying rates by the end of 1957 ranged from TL 2.82 to TL
5.75 per dollar. Most imports, when licenses could be obtained, came at TL
3.995 per dollar (2.82 plus a 40 per cent exchange tax).
Despite the increasing surcharges and tighter controls, the Turkish bal-
ance-of-paym ents situation deteriorated almost continuously and Turkish
short-term international indebtedness mounted. Export earnings fell steadily
from a peak of $396 million in 1953 to $247 mfflion in 1958. A sizeable
black market developed and, as indicated in Table 1-6, net errors and omis-
sions became large and negative. Even so, the situation was so bizarre that the
International Monetary Fund was warning readers of an estimated $100 mil-
lion or more of unrecorded imports and other significant inaccuracies in the
Turkish balance-of-payments records.35Finally, in the summer of 1958
import licensing was virtually suspended, and the Central Bank was unable to
cover its immediate debt-servicing obligations. These circumstances left the
government no choices other than declaring international bankruptcy or ac-
cepting foreign credits and the conditions attached to them. At that point the
government chose to borrow and accepted a Stabilization Program as a condi-
tion for debt restructuring.
August 1958 to August 1960: Phase III
Turkey's international indebtedness was staggering when the Stabilization
Program was agreed upon.It was estimated that as of December 1957
Turkey's foreign debt was $1,011 million,36 contrasted with 1957 exports of
$345 million.
The Stabilization Program had several parts: (1) alterations in the cx-
35. Balance of Payments Yearbook, Volume 13, International Monetary Fund (Washing-
ton), Turkey, p. 2.
36. OEEC, Turkey, 19.59, op. cit. (Note 32), p. 30.
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Trade balance 11—40 —126—72—86—125—53
Net goods and services —42—84 —182—141—159—130—25
Net donations 5640 52 4945 51 89
Net private capital 9—3043141 76 12—29
Net official capital 8 28 90—49 28113 7




Trade balance —15—37—70—86—83—168 —193
Netgoodsandservices —34—84 —127—117—123—235 —256
Net donations 67 91 91 91 99105 78
Net private capital —61 73 14 25—3450 —7
Net official capital 126—47 86—30 25111187




Trade balance —42—26 —145—78—190—189 —262
Netgoodsandservices —89—30 —109—87—228—179 —132
Net donations 23 21 27 29704662
Net private capital 58 —1 —8 —2 11—1078
Net official capital 20 39109127193192129
Errors and omissions —12—29—19—67—46—49 —137
.1
Source:international Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook (Washington),
variousissues.
change-rate system, which (2) enabled an immediate inflow of imports; (3)
removal of the source of inflationary pressure; and (4) restructuring and
consolidation of Turkish foreign indebtedness. Substantial changes were also
made in domestic monetary and fiscal policy. Multiple exchange rates were
maintained, but primarily on the export side. A uniform IL 6.20 per dollar
"exchange surtax" was imposed on all purchases of foreign exchange for
imports, invisibles and capital transactions, thus giving an actual TL 9 per
dollar exchange rate for payments abroad. Export rates were simplified, as all
exports were divided into three classes with rates of IL 4.90, 5.60 and 9.00e Turkisheconomyand its growth
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per dollar. To allow some imports into the country, credits totalling $203
million were granted by the IMF, the U.S., and the OEEC. Simultaneously,
the European Payments Union (EPU) advanced a credit of 25 million units of
account. In addition there was considerable debt rescheduling, so that the
total credit was in effect much larger. This enabled import licensing to re-
sume. To remove the sources of inflationary pressure, the Turks were asked
to balance the central government budget and to raise SEE prices (to elimi-
nate SEE deficits; see below, Chapter II). SEE prices and civil servants' sala-
ries were raised by about 20 per cent in May 1959, an action which was
immediately reflected in the price level. But Turkish prices remained virtually
constant through the end of 1961. Since that time Turkey has been a moder-
ate-inflation country, never again experiencing inflationary pressures nearly as
severe as those of the mid-l950's.
There was a sizeable short-term response to the Stabilization Program,
resulting in a net shift in Turkey's balance of payments over and above the
credits received, of over $200 million by the end of 1959. In this atmosphere
the Menderes government introduced a clearly inflationary budget early in
1960. After the Revolution in May, however, the budget was substantially
altered; one of the first acts of the new government was to devalue the
Turkish lira officially to a new rate of TL 9 to the dollar and virtually all
vestiges of a multiple exchange rate system were eliminated.
August 1960 to December 1963. Phase IV
This was the period during which the State Planning Organization devel-
oped and began implementing the First Five Year Plan. An indication of the
degree of success of devaluation is that over the life of the FFYP export
earnings exceeded their plan levels (and planned rate of increase) in each year.
From $249 million in 1958, exports rose to $336 million in 1960 and $395
million in 1963 (just below the 1953 level).
With the rapid growth of export earnings and relatively slack import de-
mand in the years 1960 and 1961 following the Revolution, the import
control system was further liberalized. Bilateral payments agreements were
terminated as they came up for renewal. Goods were transferred from the
import Quota List to the Liberalized List (for which licensing was automatic),
and goods previously not listed were added to the group of commodities
which could be legally imported. While some deletions from the list of eligible
imports were made, the motive appears to have been protection on newly-
started domestic production rather than balance-of-payments strain. Al-
though a 50 per cent tax was imposed on foreign exchange purchases for
purposes of foreign travel, the motive again appears not to have been bal-
ance-of-payments considerations, but rather that of taxing luxury consump-
tion.24 TheTurkish economy and its growth
•1
Thus the early 1960's passed in an atmosphere of relatively little strain in
the balance of payments. However, while the FFYP underestimated export
(and other foreign exchange) earnings, it also underestimated import require-
ments and overestimated the likely magnitude of foreign aid. By the end of
1963 a payments deficit was re-emerging, with imports mushrooming to $588
million in that year from $284 million in 1958 and $422 million in 1960.
January 1964 to August 1970: Phase II
A period of foreign exchange shortage followed. In 1963 and 1964 the
government reduced the number of items on the Liberalized List, tightened
quotas, raised guarantee deposit requirements, and imposed an import sur-
charge of 5 per cent on landed cost (equivalent to about 10 per cent of c.i.f.
price) in an effort to control the flood of imports. Further steps toward
tightening the import regime were taken in subsequent years.
Although imports fell sharply to $542 million in 1964, the structural shifts
the planners were attempting to effect —ahigher rate of capital formation,
more import-substitution, etc. —ledto sharp increases in import demand,
with the balance-of-payments situation remaining difficult throughout the
rest of the decade. Premia (see defInition in Explanation of Terms, Appendix
D) on import licenses rose from virtually nothing in 1963 to 40—50 per cent
of the value of the license by early 1965 and continued rising in later years.
Thus Phase II in the mid-1960's was entirely different from that in the
mid-l950's. First, the lessons of the 1950's led to an extreme reluctance to
resort to deficit financing: inflationary pressures were much smaller than in
the 1950's. Whereas Phase IIin the 1950's resulted from the generalized
pressures of excess demand, the consequent shift in relative prices, and decline
in export earnings, Phase II in the 1960's had its origins in a structural shift in
the demand for imports resulting from an altered development strategy and
the increased rate of capital formation.
The Turkish economy lurched through a series of increasingly severe pay-
ments difficulties and consequent mountingly restrictive regimes, with small
breathing spaces in which things relaxed somewhat, from 1964 until devalua-
tion in 1970. These difficulties very quickly led the Turks to develop export
premia, a special tourist exchange rate and other measures to buffer the
foreign-exchange-earning sector from the disincentive effects of the import
premia that were emerging. In fact, an export rebate scheme had become law
in 1963 but did not begin to become a significant element in export incen-
tives until 1966.
Export earnings consequently rose in every year until 1968. Workers' re-
mittances, encouraged by special premia, became a large and significant factor
in foreign exchange earnings. U
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in foreign exchange earnings. But the growth of demand for imports increased
even more rapidly, and the inflow of foreign aid did not. The licensing mecha-
nism, dividing imports into Liberalized List goods for which licenses were
automatically granted and quota goods for which licenses were issued up to a
predetermined ceiling, remained unaltered on paper. In practice, however,
licenses were granted only as foreign exchange was available and a backlog of
applications emerged. Other devices were also used to restrict imports: the
stamp duty was increased to 15 per cent in 1967 and 25 per cent in 1969 and
guarantee deposit requirements rose to over 100 per cent of the value of
licenses for many categories of imports. This latter, given delays and other
requirements, was probably the equivalent of a 25 per cent duty on some
classes of imports.
It was not until 1969 that speculation against the lira developed on a
significant scale. In anticipation of elections in 1969, the government intro-
duced an inflationary budget which resulted in a 10 per cent increase in the
price level during 1969. Export earnings which had fallen off in 1968 barely
reattained their 1967 level in 1969, and imports were simultaneously cut
back in an effort to reduce the $228 million current account deficit which
had been incurred in 1968.
August 1970 to December 1970: Phase III
In August 1970 the lira was devalued dejure to the new rate of TL 15 =
$1from its old rate of 9:1, and many of the devices introduced in the middle
and late 1960's were either relaxed or eliminated. Thus the special tourist and
workers' remittance rates were abolished, the stamp tax was reduced from 25
per cent to 10 per cent and guarantee deposit requirements were sharply
decreased. Export rebates continued for non-traditional exports, and ex-
change taxes of TL 1 to 3 per dollar were imposed on traditional exports.
Unlike the situation in 1958, however, the response to devaluation was
rapid and pronounced. There was, moreover, little interruption of domestic
economic activity, although domestic prices rose sharply.
January 1971 to Summer 1972: Phase IV
With the rapid increase in foreign exchange earnings immediately after
devaluation, Liberalized List import licenses were granted quickly and virtual-
ly automatically. Although exchange control continued, it was much less
pronounced in its effects than in the late 1960's, and premia on import
licenses virtually disappeared. Turkey's exchange reserves by the spring of
1972 exceeded $900 million, contrasted with $218 million in July 1970,
while foreign exchange earnings were continuing to increase over their 1971
level.
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Vi Plan of the book
In the following chapters various aspects of the Turkish experience will be
examined. In keeping with the focus of the project on Foreign Trade Regimes
and Economic Development, primary attention is given to three phenomena:
Phase III from August 1958 to August 1960; the nature and effects of Phase
II in the middle and late 1960's; and the resource-allocational and growth The Devaluation-(
effects of the Turkish trade and payments regimes in the 1960's.
Part Two, consisting of Chapters II to IV, is concerned with the Phase III
episode of 1958 to 1960. Chapter II contains an analysis of the factors lead-
ing up to 1958. In Chapter III an evaluation of the Stabilization Program is
given. Chapter IV is devoted to tracing the results of the devaluation package.
Part Three, consisting of Chapters V to VII, evaluates Phase II of the mid-
1960's. Chapter V concerns the role of planning in the 1960's and its inter-
action with the trade and payments regime. Chapter VI contains an analysis
of the import regime and its administration. Chapter VII analyzes the deter-
minants of foreign exchange earnings, with primary attention to export be-
havior.
Part Four focuses upon the resource-allocational and growth effects of
Turkey's trade and payments experience. Chapter VIII is concerned with the
microeconomic effects of Turkish foreign trade policies and with such evi-
dence as is available about the income-distributional effects of those policies.
Chapter IX evaluates the interaction between Turkish foreign trade and eco-
nomic growth at a more macroeconomic level, and Chapter X summarizes the
main conclusions of the study.
There are four appendices. Appendix A contains the details of the compu-
tations of effective exchange rates for exports and imports used throughout
the book and Appendix B provides data underlying results reported in Chap.
ter III. Appendix C reports briefly upon the devaluation of 1970 and its
aftermath. Although insufficient time has elapsed for detailed analysis of the
1970 episode, the preliminary data are sufficiently interesting and suggestive
to warrant at least brief mention. Appendix D is divided into three sections:
(1) defmes the general concepts used in the entire series; (2) delineates the
"Phases" used in tracing the exchange control regimes; (3) lists important
Turkish names, abbreviations, and acronyms used in the study.
L